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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Alden Lamar Hoagland, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order denying 
his Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 A grand jury indicted Hoagland on one count of lewd conduct with a minor 
under sixteen, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508, based upon its finding that 
Hoagland: 
did willfully and lewdly, commit a lewd and/or lascivious act upon 
and/or with the body of a minor, J.H., under the age of sixteen 
years, to-wit: of the age of eight (8) years …, by having manual to 
genital and/or manual to buttocks contact with the intent to arouse, 
appeal to and/or gratify the lust, passion and/or sexual desire of the 
defendant and/or said minor child. 
 
(R., pp.16-17; see also R., pp.29-35 (indictment amended to correct victim’s date 
of birth).)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hoagland agreed to plead guilty to an 
amended charge of sexual abuse of a child.  (R., pp.40-43; 5/2/05 Tr., p.4, L.13 
– p.5, L.1.)  To facilitate the parties’ agreement, the district court amended an 
unsigned copy of the indictment by interlineation, striking out the language and 
code section charging lewd conduct and replacing it with the relevant code 
section and language charging sexual abuse.  (R., pp.34-35; see also 5/2/05 Tr., 
p.5, L.3 – p.6, L.20.)  Specifically, as interlineated, the amended document 
charged: 
 ALDEN HOAGLAND, JR. is accused by the Grand Jury of 
Canyon County, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of Child Under 






 That the Defendant, ALDEN L. HOAGLAND, JR., on a date 
certain between January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2004, in the County 
of Canyon, State of Idaho, did have sexual contact with a minor, 
J.H., under the age of sixteen years, to-wit:  of the age of eight (8) 
years … by having manual to genital and/or manual to buttocks 
contact with the intent to arouse, appeal to and/or gratify the lust, 
passion and/or sexual desire of the defendant and/or said minor 
child. 
 
 All of which is contrary to Idaho Codes Section 18-1506(b) 
and against the power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
 
(R., pp.34-35.)  In response to the court’s inquiry whether “the defense waives 
any issues concerning the amending of a grand jury indictment,” defense 
counsel stated, “Judge, we’ll stipulate that these amendments can be filed.”  
(5/2/05 Tr., p.6, L.22 – p.7, L.1.)  The court thereafter accepted Hoagland’s plea 
to the amended charge (R., pp.40-43; 5/2/05 Tr., p.7, L.2 – p.12, L.16) and 
imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with three and one-half years fixed (R., 
pp.54-55).  Hoagland filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, 
which the district court denied.  (R., pp.56-59, 72-80.) 
 Several years later, on July 29, 2013, Hoagland filed a Rule 35 motion for 
correction of an illegal sentence.  (R., pp.81-87.)  Hoagland did not argue that his 
sentence for sexual abuse of a child was in excess of the statutorily prescribed 
sentence for that crime.  Instead, he argued the court never had jurisdiction over 
the sexual abuse charge because that charge was never submitted to a grand 
jury. (See id.)  The district court denied Hoagland’s Rule 35 motion, ruling that 
because the amended indictment charged the same operative facts as those 
found by the grand jury in relation to the original indictment, the jurisdiction 
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imparted by the original indictment extended to the amended charge.  (R., 







Hoagland states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hoagland’s I.C.R. 35 motion to 
correct an illegal sentence? 
 
(Revised Appellant’s Brief, p.4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Hoagland failed to show the district court erred in denying his Rule 35 





Hoagland Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion 
 
A. Introduction 
 Hoagland challenges the denial of his Rule 35 motion for correction of an 
illegal sentence, arguing as he did below that the trial court never had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the sexual abuse charge to which he pled guilty.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-12.)  Specifically, he contends the amended indictment 
was jurisdictionally defective because it “charged him with a different crime than 
the original indictment and was not endorsed by the foreman of the grand jury or 
the prosecutor.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)  Correct application of the law shows 
Hoagland’s arguments are without merit. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “[W]hether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion” are 
questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.  State v. Schmierer, 
159 Idaho 768, ___, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016).  “Jurisdiction is likewise a 
question of law and is reviewed de novo.”  Id. (citing State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 
837, 839, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257 (2011)). 
   
C. The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over The Sexual Abuse 
Of A Child Charge To Which Hoagland Pled Guilty 
 
 “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general 
type or class of dispute.”  State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255, 
1258 (2011) (internal quotes omitted).  Idaho courts have “subject matter 
jurisdiction over a crime if any essential element of the crime, including the 
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result, occurs within Idaho.”  State v. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911, 914, 828 P.2d 1316, 
1319 (1992).  “The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was 
committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the 
court.”  State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004), quoted 
in State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, ___, 368 P.3d 621, 626 (2016); see also Idaho 
Const. art. I, § 8 (“No person shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal 
offense of any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on 
information of the public prosecutor[.]”).  “‘Since the indictment or information 
provides subject matter jurisdiction to the court, the court’s jurisdictional power 
depends on the charging document being legally sufficient to survive challenge.’”  
State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, ___, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016) (quoting State 
v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 758, 101 P.3d 699, 702 (2004)).  “‘To be legally 
sufficient, a charging document must meet two requirements:  it must impart 
jurisdiction and satisfy due process.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 
695, 708, 215 P.3d 414, 428 (2009)).   
 Contrary to Hoagland’s assertions on appeal, application of the foregoing 
legal principles to the facts of this case shows the district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the charge to which Hoagland pled guilty.  The amended 
indictment alleged Hoagland committed “Sexual Abuse of Child Under Sixteen, a 
felony,” in violation of “Idaho Code Section 18-1506(b).”  (R., pp.34-35.)  
Because the amended indictment alleged an offense committed within the State 
of Idaho, it imparted the district court with subject matter jurisdiction over the 
sexual abuse charge.  See Severson, 147 Idaho at 708, 215 P.3d at 428 (“An 
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indictment confers jurisdiction when it alleges that the defendant committed a 
criminal offense in the State of Idaho.”); Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 
1132 (a “complaint alleging an offense was committed within the State of Idaho 
confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court”); State v. Olin, 153 Idaho 891, 
893, 292 P.3d 282, 284 (Ct. App. 2012) (a charging document “confers 
jurisdiction if it alleges that the defendant committed a criminal offense within the 
State of Idaho”).  Because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the sexual abuse charge, the court correctly denied Hoagland’s Rule 35 motion 
that sought to vacate his conviction and sentence based upon an alleged lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 Relying on State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 261 P.3d 519 (2011), Hoagland 
argues the amended indictment was jurisdictionally defective because it charged 
an offense different than that alleged in the original indictment without first being 
submitted to a grand jury.  (Appellant’s brief, p.12.)  Hoagland’s reliance on 
Flegel for the proposition that a prosecutor can never amend a charging 
document to allege a new or different offense without first submitting the new 
charge to a grand jury or to a magistrate for a finding of probable cause betrays 
a misunderstanding both of the facts and holding of Flegel and of the distinction 
between the concepts of jurisdiction and due process, generally. 
In Flegel, a grand jury indicted the defendant for the crime of lewd 
conduct.  151 Idaho at 526, 261 P.3d at 520.  At trial, the court instructed the jury 
on the elements of lewd conduct and on sexual abuse as an included offense.  
Id.  The jury acquitted Flegel of lewd conduct but could not reach a verdict on 
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sexual abuse.  Id.  The state thereafter filed an amended indictment charging 
Flegel with sexual abuse, but did not submit that charge to the grand jury.  Id.  A 
jury found Flegel guilty of sexual abuse following his retrial.  Id.   
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that sexual abuse is not 
an included offense of lewd conduct and held that the “prosecuting attorney had 
no authority,” after the jury acquitted Flegel of the only charge alleged in the 
original indictment, “to issue an amended indictment for a crime that was not 
charged in the original indictment and that was not an included offense of that 
crime.”  Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526, 261 P.3d at 520; see also McIntosh, 160 Idaho 
at ___, 368 P.3d at 627 (“In Flegel, we held that an amended indictment was 
invalid because the State could not amend an indictment after the jury had 
acquitted the defendant of the crime charged in the indictment in order to include 
a non-included offense without first submitting it to the grand jury and filing a new 
information [sic].”).  The Court reasoned that, “To allow a prosecutor to amend 
an indictment to charge an offense other than that for which the defendant was 
held to answer would permit the prosecutor to, in essence, become the grand 
jury.”  Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526-527, 261 P.3d at 520-521.  “Because the 
amended indictment charged a different crime than the crime charged in the 
original indictment,” and because sexual abuse is not a lesser included offense 
of lewd conduct, “the amended indictment [was] a nullity,” and “the district court 
never had subject matter jurisdiction” over the sexual abuse charge.  Id. at 530-
31, 261 P.3d at 524-25. 
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 The facts of Flegel are clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. 
The prosecutor in Flegel unilaterally filed an amended indictment charging a non-
included offense after a jury had acquitted Flegel of the only crime alleged in the 
original indictment.  The amended indictment was invalid and, thus, failed to 
impart jurisdiction, because the prosecutor “had no authority” to file a new 
charge, without resubmitting the matter to a grand jury, after the original 
indictment was effectively a dead letter.  Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530-31, 261 P.3d 
at 524-25; McIntosh, 160 Idaho at ___, 368 P.3d at 627; see also Lute, 150 
Idaho at 841, 252 P.3d at 1259 (2011) (where the grand jury term had expired, 
“a valid indictment was never entered against Lute, the district court never had 
subject matter jurisdiction over Lute’s case under Article I, section 8 of the Idaho 
Constitution.”).  Here, in contrast, the original indictment giving the district court 
subject matter jurisdiction remained in full force and effect up to the moment the 
court amended the indictment with Hoagland’s consent.  That the charge was 
amended without resubmission to a grand jury did not divest the district court of 
jurisdiction because, unlike in Flegel, the prosecutor and/or court in this case had 
“authority” to amend the charge without a new probable cause finding pursuant 
to Hoagland’s consent.  See Schmierer, 159 Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 166 
(citing Brown v. State, 159 Idaho 496, 497 n.2, 363 P.3d 337, 338 n.2 (2015)) 
(“Although the charging document was issued without a preliminary examination, 




 In arguing that Flegel requires resubmission to a grand jury in every case 
where an indictment is amended to allege a new offense, Hoagland 
misapprehends the distinction between jurisdiction and due process.  Article 1, 
section 8 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees criminal defendants facing a 
felony charge the right to a finding of probable cause either by a grand jury or by 
a magistrate following a preliminary hearing.  See Schmierer, 159 Idaho at ___, 
367 P.3d at 165; State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 
1995).  As recently reiterated by the Idaho Supreme Court, however, the right to 
a probable cause determination is not jurisdictional but may instead be waived 
by a valid guilty plea.  Schmierer, 159 Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 166 (“a 
defendant waives his right to a preliminary examination by pleading guilty without 
objection”); Brown, 159 Idaho at 497 n.2, 363 P.3d at 338 n.2.1   
 Unlike the defendant in Flegel, who was deprived without his consent of a 
grand jury finding of probable cause for a new offense after being acquitted of 
the only charge alleged in the original indictment, Hoagland consented to the
                                            
1 Although Schmierer and Brown both involved the waiver of a preliminary 
hearing, there is no principled basis to distinguish between the waiver of a 
probable cause finding by a magistrate and the waiver of a probable cause 
finding by a grand jury; in fact, other courts that have considered the issue have 
expressly held that the right to a grand jury may be waived.  See United States v. 
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (“In contrast” to defects in subject-matter 
jurisdiction, “the grand jury right can be waived.”); Short v. United States, 471 
F.3d 686, 695 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In light of this modern shift in the procedural rules 
and recent caselaw, we conclude that a defendant may waive his right to 
reindictment by a grand jury.  We confine this holding, however, to the present 
circumstance concerning a guilty plea to the amended indictment ….”); People v. 
Curry, 210 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Mich.App. 1973) (holding that, where the 
indictment was amended to charge a new offense, “the trial court had jurisdiction 
to accept defendant’s plea to the amended indictment.”). 
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amendment of the indictment to allege sexual abuse of a child, instead of lewd 
conduct, to take advantage of the plea agreement in this case.  Hoagland had 
the right to waive a probable cause determination by the grand jury on the 
amended charge, and, unlike the defendant in Flegel, he expressly did so by 
“stipulat[ing]” to the amendment and pleading guilty.  (See 5/2/05 Tr., p.6, L.22 – 
p.12, L.16.)  There is nothing about the amended sexual abuse charge or the 
manner in which probable cause was established (i.e., by waiver) that divested 
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over that charge.2 
 In addition to complaining about the lack of a grand jury finding of 
probable cause, Hoagland argues the amended indictment “was insufficient to 
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court” because it “was not signed 
by anyone and therefore did not meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-1401.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)  Hoagland does not even attempt to explain why the 
lack of a signature is a jurisdictional defect.  Nor could he successfully do so 
because, whether the amended charging document is viewed as an amended 
indictment or a mislabeled information, correct application of the law shows the 
lack of a signature thereon was merely a defect in form and did not implicate the 
court’s jurisdiction. 
                                            
2 The district court concluded submission of the amended charge to the grand 
jury was not required because the amended charge was based on the same 
operative facts as the charge contained in the original indictment.  (R., pp.44-49.)  
The state agrees with the district court’s analysis and hereby incorporates it by 
reference.  The state submits, however, that where, as here, the defendant 
consented to a an amendment of the charging document to take advantage of a 
plea agreement, the fact that the amendment charges an entirely new crime is 
irrelevant and does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. 
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 When an indictment is found by a grand jury, “it must be endorsed, a true 
bill, and the endorsement must be signed by the foreman of the grand jury.” 
I.C. § 19-1401.  “Contrastingly, an information must be endorsed by the 
prosecutor ….”  Schmierer, 159 Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 166 (citing, inter alia, 
I.C. § 19-1302).  While compliance with these statutory requirements is obviously 
preferred, nothing in the statute or relevant case law indicates the lack of an 
endorsement on a charging document is a jurisdictional defect.  In fact, Idaho 
Code § 19-1419 specifically contemplates that not all indictments will comply 
perfectly with every statutorily mandated pleading requirement.  That statute, 
governing the effect of defects of form of indictments, states that “[n]o indictment 
is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon, be 
affected, by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form, which does 
not tend to the prejudice of a substantial right of the defendant upon its merits.”  
I.C. § 19-1419.  The statute applies equally to defects of form in informations.  
Schmierer, 159 Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 166 (citing I.C. § 19-1304; State v. 
McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 818, 430 P.2d 886, 896 (1967)). 
 That the lack of an endorsement is a defect in form, and not a 
jurisdictional defect, finds support in a number of cases.  Indeed, over a century 
ago the Supreme Court of the United States explained that the lack of an 
endorsement or signature of the foreman is not jurisdictional, and that there was 
“general unanimity of the authorities to this effect.”  Frisbie v. U.S., 157 U.S. 160, 
163-65 (1895); see also Applewhite v. State, 597 S.W.2d 328, 329-30 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1979) (recognizing signature of the grand jury foreman was 
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mandatory under state statute, but adopting the majority rule that the omission 
was not jurisdictional, explaining “foreman’s signature has come to be viewed as 
a procedural safeguard rather than a substantive requisite of an indictment, such 
that its presence or absence does not materially affect any substantial right of 
the defendant; and … neither assures to him nor prevents him from having a fair 
trial”); Humphrey v. Lynaugh, 861 F.2d 875, 877 (5th Cir. 1988) (the foreman’s 
failure to sign the indictment was not jurisdictional); Justice v. McMackin, 558 
N.E.2d 1183, 1183 (Ohio 1990) (“A grand jury foreman’s failure to sign the 
indictment does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction.”); Goulden v. State, 299 
So.2d 325, 326 (Ala. 1974) (“The failure of the foreman of the grand jury to 
endorse the indictment as a true bill did not deprive the circuit court of 
jurisdiction.”); Byrd v. Twomery, 277 N.E.2d 358, 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (same); 
West v. State, 92 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Ind. 1950) (same). 
 In Gasper v. Dist. Ct. of Seventh Judicial Dist., 74 Idaho 388, 392, 264 
P.2d 679, 681 (1953), the defendant contended the indictment was not 
“endorsed and presented as prescribed in § 19-1401, I.C.” because the foreman 
failed to sign the endorsement.  After explaining the contents of the indictment 
and that the foreman’s signature was on the indictment elsewhere, the Idaho 
Supreme Court concluded “this is a sufficient and substantial compliance with 
the statute” because “[t]he defect here is a matter of form which does not tend to 
prejudice any substantial rights of the defendant.”  Id. at 392-93 (citing I.C. § 19-
1419).  Gasper indicates that the failure to follow I.C. § 19-1401 is not 
jurisdictional.  More importantly, it establishes that errors associated with 
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I.C. § 19-1401 do not affect the substantial rights of the defendant, but are 
merely a “defect or imperfection in matter of form, which does not tend to the 
prejudice of a substantial right of the defendant upon its merits.”  Id.   
 The error associated with the lack of an endorsement on the amended 
indictment charging Hoagland with sexual abuse was merely a defect in form 
and did not prejudice Hoagland’s substantial rights.  Hoagland consented to the 
amendment of the indictment and the amendment was accomplished in open 
court while Hoagland was present.  Although it would have been better practice 
for the prosecutor to have signed the amended charging document, Hoagland 
has not even argued, much less established, that the omission affected the 
fairness of the proceedings.  Nor has he shown any reason why, to this day, the 
lack of an endorsement could not be corrected by the mere the expedient of 
having the prosecutor sign the document nunc pro tunc.  Because the record 
shows Hoagland was not prejudiced by the lack of an endorsement on the 
amended charging document, the error was “a mere defect of form and [did] not 
deprive the court of jurisdiction” over the amended charge.  Schmierer, 159 
Idaho at ___, 367 P.3d at 166. 
 For all of the foregoing reasons, Hoagland has failed to show the district 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the sexual abuse of a child charge to 
which he pled guilty.  Having failed to make that showing, Hoagland has failed to 
show the court erred in denying his Rule 35 motion that sought to vacate his 






 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Hoagland’s Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence. 
 DATED this 12th day of July, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Lori A. Fleming______ 
 LORI A. FLEMING 
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